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1.
 
Introduction
 
When we ask parents which hopes or wishes they have for their chil-
dren, we expect to get different answers, but also that these have a
common denominator, namely that their children will lead a flour-
ishing life. Of course parents may expect or even be certain that the
lives of their children will be difficult; parents who live in deprived
areas or whose children have a severe physical disability know that
their children’s lives will be challenging, but it would be against nor-
mal expectations if they would wish or hope this for their children.
For, although a flourishing life is not necessarily a life without strug-
gle, it is reasonable to assume that adversarial circumstances make it
more difficult to flourish. 
In this paper I want to address two related questions: What makes
life flourishing and how can parents and teachers contribute to the
likelihood that children will lead a flourishing life? The first section
addresses the meaning of the concept ‘flourishing’. The second
section describes the conception of ‘flourishing’ that I underwrite
as well as the conditions required to come to lead a flourishing life.
In the third section I explore the educational implications of this
concept.
2.
 
Human Flourishing
 
The verb ‘to flourish’ intimates that a person is thriving, has a good
life or that life is good to her. Although the use of the term ‘human
flourishing’ is relatively new, the debate about the concept is of
course centuries old. I think that translating the Greek 
 
eudaimonia
 
 into
human flourishing instead of happiness is advantageous, because
the term ‘happiness’ has hedonistic overtones and often a too
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narrow focus on particular feelings and states of a person. Certainly,
‘happiness’ is not necessarily interpreted in a hedonistic or ego-
centred way, but the current dominant understanding is that being
happy means being joyful, satisfied or self-content (see for instance
Baumeister, 1991). I also prefer to use ‘human flourishing’ instead
of ‘well-being’, because this term might give less cause for the idea
that people cannot flourish if they do things they have an interest in,
but which are not necessarily in their interest. A lot can and should
be said about the distinction between ‘in one’s interest’ and ‘having
an interest in’, but for now I take the position that one can flourish
in situations in which the interest of someone else prevails over one’s
own. For example, some mothers flourish by devoting their own life
to the well-being of their children and some people, like Albert
Schweitzer, set aside their own interest for the care of others. These
people flourish through their supererogatory acts, which are by
definition not done out of or in one’s own interest. 
It is common to use the concepts ‘flourishing life’ and ‘good life’
interchangeably and I will do so as well, even though there seem to
be two arguments against perceiving them as being similar. First, it
is questionable whether or not ‘flourishing’ and ‘having a good life’
refer to the same level of well-being. In saying that someone is thriv-
ing we indicate that she is doing really well, that she is prospering or
excelling, which suggests that her life has a particular level of good-
ness. Having a good life does not necessarily imply a high(er) level
of well-being, for instance when ‘a good life’ is interpreted as ‘a good
enough life’. In this case, a person’s life is fine, or with a popular
expression, OK, which indicates that she is doing well, but not
extremely well. Secondly, it is possible to make a distinction between
having a good life and living a good life (Frankena, 1970, 1973). The
first is a morally neutral, prudential conception of ‘good’. When we
say at Anna’s funeral that she has had a good life or that life was
good to her, we mean that her life was not overshadowed by difficul-
ties or that she had a prosperous life. In saying that she lived a good
life, we make a moral judgement. We do not have to believe that the
life of the person was morally superior or characterised by moral
supererogatives to say she lived a good life, but it does not seem to
accord with our linguistic intuitions to say that an immoral person
lived a good life. Thus, ‘a good life’ can be used in a moral and non-
moral sense and for a moral and non-moral evaluation. This distinc-
tion does not seem applicable to ‘flourishing’. Although we might
not say that all in all Hitler led a flourishing life, we could say that
he did flourish during the heights of the Nazi-regime. Equally, a per-
son can lead a morally questionable life, for instance because she is
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an active member of a racist organisation, but flourish in this organ-
isation, as a partner and mother and through her work.
For our understanding of ‘flourishing’, it is also helpful to make
two other distinctions in the way in which the term is used. The first
distinction refers to the length of flourishing. On the one hand,
‘flourishing’ can be used to give an indication about the quality of a
life of a person over a longer period of time, to give a positive evalu-
ation of a person’s life overall. On the other hand it is used for
particular periods in which we believe the person is flourishing. For
instance, when someone is enjoying a holiday after a very stressful
period at work and we see her relax and prospering by walking in the
mountains and reading novels we would say that she (finally) flour-
ishes. This example also illustrates that it is possible to say that a
person flourishes at a particular moment, but overall does not lead
a flourishing life. The second distinction is related to the scope of
flourishing. On the one hand, we use ‘flourishing’ in a general way,
which refers to an overall evaluation as well. Here the criterion is not
time, but aspects or domains of life. On the other hand we can say
that a person is flourishing in a particular role. This allows one to say
that a person is flourishing as a mother or as a teacher, but is not
flourishing overall, for instance because her relationship with her
partner is problematic. This possibility gives rise to the question of
whether flourishing is a threshold term or if it is gradual, i.e. if one
can say that someone flourishes only if she prospers in all the
domains or that even though she does not thrive in one domain, she
flourishes up to a certain level. I would argue that it is both, in a cer-
tain sense; it depends on the intrusiveness of the non-flourishing in
a domain. For instance, while it is difficult to imagine that Alice, who
has no alternative but to do a debasing job that she detests, flour-
ishes as long she is in that position, we can envisage that Eileen,
who has a job that is not great and therefore does not contribute
to her flourishing but who does not attach any negative value to it,
can flourish nevertheless. It is however correct to say that one would
flourish more if one’s job would be conducive as well.
3.
 
Conceptions of Human Flourishing
 
What makes life a flourishing life and under which conditions or
with which characteristics a person will thrive, is a matter of conten-
tion within philosophy and additionally there are diverse cultural
and religious substantive conceptions of a good life. It is for instance
quite obvious that Buddhists have a different conception of human
flourishing than hedonists. I will first give a concise description of
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the two major, opposing, theories of human flourishing, namely the
objective account found in objective-list theories and perfectionism
and the subjective account found in hedonistic, actual desire theo-
ries and informed desire theories. Both have characteristics that I
find necessary for a theory about human flourishing and therefore
I will defend a combined theory or middle position.
 
Human Flourishing can be Objectively Determined 
 
Objective theories argue that we can objectively identify characteristics
of human life independent of a person’s (emotional) endorsement
which, when satisfied, entail human flourishing. Whether or not a
person likes the goods, wants them or values them is irrelevant for the
judgement that the goods are conducive to a person’s flourishing (see
for instance Arneson, 1999). The goods are intrinsically good, or good
 
per se
 
. Items on the objective lists are related to characteristics of human
beings or their biological characteristics, for instance health and
physical pursuits, friendship/social relations, safety, intellectual
development, creative development, freedom and materialistic pos-
sessions (see Aristotle, 1985; Hurka, 1993; Maslow, 1970; Raz, 1986). 
The idea that flourishing is independent of the perspective of an
agent, that it does not require the acknowledgement of a person that
she flourishes, does not conform to my linguistic or psychological
intuition. I fail to see how we can say that a person is flourishing if she
does not share that evaluation. Someone might object and say that
we can give her the objective reasons as to why she is flourishing and
that the correct criteria will change her evaluation. This, however, is
only sensible if we regard her subjective acknowledgement as being
necessary for her flourishing, for if her flourishing is not increased
or diminished by her own evaluation, there is no reason to convince
her. Therefore, this objection affirms the position it tries to reject. 
 
Human Flourishing is Subjectively Assessed
 
According to a subjective interpretation of human flourishing,
humans thrive if and only if they themselves feel or know they do, i.e.
humans flourish if they experience or believe they flourish and only
if they do, do they flourish. This can be interpreted as having a par-
ticular state of mind, for instance being exhilarated, ‘over the moon’
or deeply satisfied. However, such an account is too narrow and edu-
cationally suspect. First, it reduces human beings to one-dimensional,
hedonistic, creatures and would justify (educational) practices which
aim to ensure that people are constantly in a happy state, for instance
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by providing happy pills or connecting children from early age onto
Nozick’s famous experience machine. Secondly, it restricts the kind
of desires to those which give us pleasure and it is clear that people
have desires which do not lead to this psychological satisfaction
but do contribute to their well-being. For instance, my desire to look
after my ill father can certainly contribute to my well-being, for
instance because I know he will be better off if I do so than if I do
not, but it does not make me particularly thrilled – that such an
emotion would also be morally suspect is another matter, which I will
not discuss here.
A subjective theory in which human flourishing does not have
these hedonistic connotations is the informed desire theory. There
are two aspects that are characteristic for this theory. The first is that
people will flourish if they fulfil the desires that benefit their well-
being. Which desires do so is not obvious and therefore, in contrast
with the actual desire theory, the informed desire theory argues that
people’s flourishing is enhanced if they reflect on the desire and
rank their desires in order of preference. The second characteristic
is that the desires include longings that are not related to an appet-
itive state or whose fulfilment does not give psychological satisfaction
(Griffin, 1986). We can, for instance, have an informed desire to be
told the truth about our health instead of being ignorant about a
lethal disease. By giving up the requirement of a person’s positive
experience and defining fulfilment in terms of the desire being real-
ised instead of psychological fulfilment, the informed desire theory
enlarges the classes of values that can be interpreted as desires.
An argument against the informed desire theory is that it seems to
exclude the possibility that people flourish because something happens
to them or is being done to them that they did not desire, but being
actualised makes them aware that it does contribute to their flour-
ishing. I think it is possible that situations or actions that happen to
us without being desired have such qualities. We can be surprised by
someone or by an activity. I know for instance of people who had an
informed desire not to become parents, but when by accident con-
ceived a child realised that this did contribute to their flourishing.
Thus, both the objective account and the subjective account have
aspects that are necessary for human flourishing. This brings me to
propose a theory that combines the two sides.
 
Human Flourishing as a Purposeful or Meaningful Life
 
A combined or mixed theory has both objective and person-related
aspects. There are two aspects that are objective, namely (a) human
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flourishing is itself perceived as an objective value, something that
has worth in and of itself and (b) human flourishing is dependent
on or requires particular goods and character, which we can object-
ively establish. The first aspect is not denied by subjective interpre-
tations of human flourishing, in which it is also assumed that human
flourishing is good in itself and not because it is desired. What
defenders of subjective interpretations argue is that whether or not
this is the case is based on the subjective interpretation of the person.
Three remarks must be made about the goods that can be objectively
established. First, human flourishing comprises several goods – I
have already mentioned the goods of health, social relations, and
safety, intellectual, creative and physical pursuits-; there is no over-
arching or dominant good or end that makes people flourish. Sec-
ondly, the goods should not be interpreted as being instrumental in
the sense that their satisfaction is a means to human flourishing. In
satisfying the goods, people actually flourish. In that sense, we can
say, that flourishing is a type of what Elster (1981) calls ‘essentially
by-products’. Similar to Elster’s argument that it is impossible to
strive after happiness directly, one can only flourish through pursu-
ing and satisfying the objective goods and will flourish by doing so.
Thirdly, adopting the idea from the objective list theory that goods
are characteristic for human beings does not imply that they are
good for humans only or that they, as a cluster, describe what is dis-
tinct for human beings. Neither does the fact that the goods are
good for all human beings, because they all share the same charac-
teristics, mean that they are good for all in the same way. This brings
us to the agent relative aspects, because people have different ways
of pursuing the goods in order to flourish. 
Flourishing requires that the person gives her own meaning to the
objective goods or develops her own interpretation. The objectively
identifiable goods are so general that they are in themselves not suf-
ficient to assist a person to lead a flourishing life. The person herself
has to construct her own interpretation of the goods. For instance,
one of the objective goods is having relationships. However, the
way in which one pursues this domain, for instance by having one
exclusive relationship, several friendships and many acquaintances,
and what kind of exclusive relationship contributes to one’s flourish-
ing, is person dependent. Where one person flourishes by having
a spiritual relationship with a deity, others thrive by having a long-
term commitment to a person of the same or different gender
and again others prosper by not having an exclusive relationship
at all. Thus, although there are objectively identifiable goods,
human flourishing is personal and diverse, because there are
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many ways in which people can interpret and combine the diverse
generic goods. 
The basic criterion in this conception of human flourishing is
‘purpose’ or ‘meaning’: being able to give meaning to the objective
goods makes it possible for people to flourish (see also de Ruyter,
2002). They must see the point of the pursuit of the goods and be
able to identify with the way in which they are pursuing it. By giving
their own interpretation of the abstract goods and pursuing this
conception, people also have a meaning in life. ‘Meaning’ therefore
operates in a twofold way: people give their own meaning or inter-
pretation to the abstract goods and by doing so they are able to give
meaning or sense to their life. As psychological research confirms
(for instance Argyle, 2001; Baumeister, 1991; O’Connor and Cham-
berlain, 1996), people find meaning in life by doing and creating
things and by engaging with others. 
Having meaning in life is a necessary, though not sufficient, con-
dition for human flourishing, for circumstances in which a person
lives might make it impossible for her to flourish even though she
finds her life meaningful. It is also possible that a person values her
conception of a generic good more than life itself, in which case it
is possible to say that a person flourishes by putting her own life at
risk for the good. Williams, for instance, argues that ‘there is no con-
tradiction in the idea of a man’s dying for a ground project – quite
the reverse, since if death really is necessary for the project, then to
live would be to live with it unsatisfied, something which, if it really
is his ground project, he has no reason to do’ (1981, p. 13).
 
1
 
The notion of meaning is, I think, also a plausible interpretation
of the requirement that a person acknowledges that she flourishes.
For instance, Arneson objects to the idea that things only make a
contribution to human flourishing if they are endorsed by the per-
son, because he argues that a person’s reasons might be weak, con-
fused, or nonexistent (1999, p. 136). However, he draws the wrong
conclusion, because he looks at the wrong things. He builds his case
around Samantha who has written a brilliant poem, but denies its
value because of her bad aesthetic theory. She does not think it is all
that great and therefore does not perceive it to be contributing to
her well-being. His argument focuses on the fact that she lacks the
appropriate appreciation of the worth of her poem, but he does not
take into account her evaluation of the activity as well as her own
evaluation of the product. For, he assumes that she has worked on
her poem with enthusiasm, that she spent a lot of time on it and took
pleasure in the process and product. This means that her activity and
its outcome had a purpose and were meaningful for her. Therefore,
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I would argue that writing the poem contributed to her flourishing.
I do acknowledge, and in that sense are not in complete disagree-
ment with Arneson, that it is not unreasonable to presume that she
would flourish more if she would have the appropriate appreciation
of her poem. In this case, her justified feeling of pride of her accom-
plishment would have enhanced her flourishing.
To conclude, I believe that human flourishing consists of two
aspects: generic goods that are objectively identifiable and the mean-
ingful interpretation of these goods by the person herself. This is not
a novel idea; Rasmussen (1999) defends a similar position, which he
calls neo-Aristotelian. If we accept the idea that people have to give
their own interpretation to the objectively identified goods, we pre-
sume that they do not blindly follow a particular path they cross or
simply adopt the ideas of others; they do what they believe best or
good within the defined domains. This requires not only that they
are able to make such decisions independently and wisely, but also
that they perceive themselves as being responsible for their own
interpretation: they are the authors of their own conception. It does
not exclude the possibility that people adopt the interpretation of
others; there is no necessity for authenticity or originality. However,
when they follow the interpretation of others, they do so for good
reasons. Equally, it is perfectly possible for children to flourish within
a framework they have adopted from their parents. It depends,
however, whether or not they can share their parents’ conception.
For example, in Saudi Arabia girls are raised within an orthodox
religious community but are given the opportunity to go to (a single
sex) university. Some of them believe they will flourish by being a
barrister instead of being a full-time mother. If the community does
not allow them to pursue this career, there are ample reasons to pre-
sume that they will not flourish. Of course, if they believe that being
a full-time mother is conducive to their well-being and do not wish
to pursue a career or an independent life, this schism does not arise.
What are the educational implications of this conception of human
flourishing? 
4.
 
Education towards a Flourishing Life
 
There does not seem to be a lot of disagreement amongst philoso-
phers about whether or not we can determine goods in or domains
of life which, in principle, are beneficial for all human beings. The
question is if these are good for everyone and can therefore be
objectively determined as being conducive to human flourishing.
In the former section I have taken a middle position, arguing that
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although these goods are good for everyone, flourishing presup-
poses that people are able to live their life according to their own
interpretation or purpose of the goods. This requires that people
should become reflective actors or practically wise human beings:
people need to be able to weigh the goods and give them an inter-
pretation that is good for them now and later, taking into account
external and internal factors, as well as be able to reflect about the
ways in which their conception of the goods can be realised. Trans-
lating this into educational terms, I would argue that educators
should pass on knowledge of the goods so that children understand
what is conducive to human flourishing and should assist them to
develop practical wisdom or reflective decision-making. Educators
should be confident and modest: confident in their responsibility to
educate children about the goods that are important for their flour-
ishing and modest in their views about and attitudes against the
ways they believe that people can pursue the goods and make them
meaningful.
The first educational task is theoretically the least controversial,
but not in practice. For, educating children about the generic goods
that contribute to their flourishing, cannot merely consist of the
transmission of knowledge about the goods, but also requires examples
of diverse ways in which these domains are interpreted by people
as well as educators who foster these goods. The first can clearly
be contentious, because interpretations can be opposite and not all
educators are willing to inform children about ways of life they do
not agree with. But, the requirement that educators foster the goods
is not unproblematic either. For instance, what are the implications
of suggesting that educators exemplify a generic good like health?
Does it mean that educators are not allowed to smoke? How often
can they take their children to McDonald’s (if at all)? Do parents
need to exercise frequently?
The good of having relationships with others seems to be the con-
clusive argument for the importance of moral education. For does
not being moral give one the best chances of maintaining relation-
ships with others? I think it does, but the flourishing mother and
spouse who is active in a racist organisation in which she flourishes
is a challenging counter example. As long as she does not do any-
thing illegal, which would separate her from her children and hus-
band, she can flourish in the relationships within her confined
group. I think we have to accept this exception, which does not
prevent us from trying to convince her that it is morally wrong
wanting to deny other people the same opportunities as she has
and that a society without racial hatred will be a more prosperous
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and thriving one, which will be conducive for her own flourishing
as well.
Secondly, educators should assist children to become practically
wise people who can ‘deliberate finely about what is good and ben-
eficial for himself, not about some restricted area – e.g. about what
promotes health or strength – but what promotes living well in gen-
eral’ (Aristotle, 1140a, 25–30). To be able to do so, Aristotle argues,
we need virtue. For the development of virtue as well as defining
one’s own interpretation of good, children need experience and
guidance: they need experience to become able deliberators on
what is virtuous, i.e. the mean between a deficient or excessive inter-
pretation of a particular good which serves both themselves and
others, and they need their own experience to assist them in decid-
ing how they wish to pursue good. This is something that educators
cannot give to children directly, but they can give children informa-
tion and advice and most important they can give children freedom
of exploration. Educators have a more direct role in cultivating the
capacities to deliberate by passing on knowledge, assisting children
to think and reflect, and foremost by being an example to the children
and by offering other exemplars. 
Practical wisdom is not only an educational aim, but also some-
thing that educators themselves need in order to be an example for
the children and to assist children in developing plans that can con-
tribute to realising the interpretation of the good they believe to be
meaningful in the future. However, children should also learn that:
a) They will not flourish by fulfilling one good only; neglecting all
other goods will undermine their flourishing (although some can
be at times less important than at others). This means that even
though the development of some talents requires that children need
to spend a lot of time and energy in developing particular capac-
ities and dispositions, other goods like friendship and develop-
ment of dispositions like intellectual curiosity or friendliness
should not be neglected. I do not believe that the education of
children should be completely balanced in the sense that it
addresses all goods equally, but neglecting goods in the educa-
tion of children might undermine the child’s chances of flourish-
ing in the future.
b) Their interpretations of the goods and their conception of what
provides meaning can change or might require a change. The
fact that one flourishes in the pursuit of a particular ideal or job,
does not mean that these sources cannot become meaningless.
The dramatic changes in the lives of Saul, John Stuart Mill and
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Henri Nouwen, but also changes people need to make if they dis-
cover that certain options are not open to them, show that people
should have a certain flexibility and openness in order to be able
to deal with meaning-changing situations.
c) They need will-power to pursue their goods because their
achievement can be difficult and demanding at times (see for
instance MacIntyre, 1981, p. 204). Leading a flourishing life is
not necessarily easy or pleasurable all the time. 
Finally, the development of a meaningful interpretation of the goods
or domains takes place in a social environment, which is a source of
and a corrective for developing a meaningful interpretation. There
are several aspects to this social influence. First, paraphrasing Taylor
(1992), I want to argue that meaning takes on importance against a
background of horizons, which is a metaphor for the ideas and
ideals of a society or community as to what is to count as important
or significant. Of course, this does not entail uncritical adoption of
these values, because this would contradict the importance of self-
direction. Secondly, societies determine the limits of interpretations
one can legitimately give. For example, where Mormons believe it is
justified for a man to marry several women and some men and women
might find this a meaningful interpretation of their long-term rela-
tionship, the US law forbids polygamy. Therefore, wise parents will
pass on to their children that this is not an interpretation that will
lead to their flourishing. They might enthuse or enthusiastically sup-
port their children in trying to having laws changed. Laws are not
unchangeable or incorrigible. An obvious example within the same
domain is of course the fact that gay marriage is no longer illegal in many
European countries. However, until such is the case, people can
thrive by pursuing the change in law, but normally will find it almost
impossible to do so by living unlawfully. Third, the fact that society
and community influences one’s interpretation does not imply a
moral relativist account of flourishing. It is possible to say that one
person’s way of flourishing is better than another one. For instance,
people who flourish by caring for others lead a better life than peo-
ple who flourish by abusing others. Neither does it imply a prudent
relativist account of flourishing. If a person believes she flourishes by
starving herself to a desired skeleton figure, we have good reasons to
question her conception of the goods of social relations and self-
esteem. As Raz maintains, ‘The social dependence of value has noth-
ing to do with the affirmation of social practices as reasons for their
own validity. [ … ] They are necessary for the existence of values. But
they are not their justification’ (1999, p. 210; see also Raz, 2003). 
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The education described makes it possible that children will lead
a flourishing life; it does not guarantee their flourishing. This is evi-
dently impossible, because the future cannot be foreseen and life
cannot be controlled. Parents and teachers can and should do what
they can to make it as likely as possible that their children will flour-
ish. However, the proposal affirms the educational view that parents
should gradually decrease their paternalistic stance toward their chil-
dren and assist children to develop their own interpretation of the
goods. If humans only flourish if they can subscribe to the meaning
they believe is right, paternalism cannot enhance human flourish-
ing, because it infringes a person’s self-determination. Equally, it
implies that educators should not prevent their children from having
‘an open future’, because educators do not know which life will be
meaningful to children. For instance, parents should not proscribe
which kind of relationship children must have as an adult, what kind
of job they should pursue or which kind of religion (if at all) chil-
dren should adhere to, because they do not know which of the pos-
sibilities will in fact be meaningful for their children. They can only
convey that these goods are important for the children now and as
adults later and assist children to be able to make them contribute
to their flourishing. Of course this does not prohibit parents from
sharing their own conception with the children. It would not even be
possible not to do so, given the right of parents to pursue a life they
believe conducive to their own flourishing. It ‘only’ claims that their
educational responsibility to assist children to be able to live a flour-
ishing life requires that they allow their children to discover for
themselves what will make their life as flourishing. 
5.
 
Note
 
1
 
Williams’ notion of ground project is comparable to Frankfurt’s concept of ideals
(1999). A ground project or a set of projects encompass a person’s deepest com-
mitments, things about which the person cares so much that she has to act
according to these projects or ideals. A ground project, therefore, has a profound
influence on one’s identity or one’s self-description and gives meaning to a
person’s life (Frankfurt, 1999, p. 112–115; Williams, 1981, p. 12).
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